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Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science
JOSHUA C. TATE
The concept of an insane delusion appears in several branches of the,
law, including contracts, gifts, and wills. Critics of the traditional doctrine
have made compelling arguments in favor of its modification or abolition in
the context of wills, given that it is often used as an excuse to substitute the
values ofjurors for those of the testator. Moreover, recent scientific studies
have shown correlations between delusions and other cognitive
impairments, calling into question the need for an independent doctrine of
insane delusion. Nevertheless, there is evidence that not all deluded
individuals have additional cognitive biases, and those who do may have
some impairments while lacking others. Due to the nature of gratuitous
transfers, adoption of the fairness-based approach to mental illness in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is not a feasible alternative to the
traditional insane delusion doctrine for wills. This Article accordingly
proposes a new use for the concept of a delusion in making legal
determinations regarding mental capacity in the context of wills. The
concept would be better formulated as a doctrine of partial sanity, used
when a testator is found to lack general mental capacity, and only as a basis
for upholding all or part ofa will. Under such a rule, the issue ofa testator's
general mental capacity would be decidedfirst. Ifthe person in question had
general mental capacity, the will would be held valid. But if the person did
lack general mental capacity, the court would then consider whether the
testator was capable ofmaking some rational decisions. To the extent that a
particular decision was the product of rational decision making, the testator
would be deemed to have had the capacity to make that decision. This would
preserve, in modifiedform, a legal concept that has existedfor centuries and
remains relevant in modern science, without giving excessive license to
courts and juries to second-guess the lifestyles and eccentricities of
individuals.
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Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science
JOSHUA C. TATE
INTRODUCTION
In the early nineteenth century, American physician John Eberle made
an effort to define the psychiatric condition then known as "monomania,"
which "consists in a state of partial insanity."' As anecdotal evidence of the
existence of this condition, Eberle related the story of a barber from
Lancaster "who continued to occupy himself regularly and cheerfully with
his customers, and to converse rationally upon all subjects except his own
fortune, and the universal conspiration among his neighbours to poison
him." 2 The barber accordingly sought out his own food supply from a river
that "could contain no poison, since the fish continued to live in it."' In other
words, while he generally perceived the world in the same way as his
neighbors, in one important respect the barber inhabited his own personal
reality into which reason could not intrude.
A modem psychiatrist might diagnose the Lancaster barber as having a
delusional disorder of the persecutory type.4 A judge might conclude more
generally that the barber suffered from an "insane delusion," or "a belief that
is so against the evidence and reason that it must be the product of
* Associate Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law. For their insightful comments, I wish to thank
Gregory Alexander, Alyssa DiRusso, Tom Gallanis, Joanna Grossman, Lisa Hasday, Tanya Hernandez,
John Langbein, Meghan Ryan, and Stewart Sterk, as well as all those who attended my presentations on
this subject at meetings of the Association of American Law Schools, the Southeastern Association of
Law Schools, the Law and Society Association, and the SMU Dedman School of Law Faculty Forum. I
also appreciate the help of Gregory Ivy and the staff of SMU's Underwood Law Library, as well as my
research assistants Jordan Foreman, Zaira Khan, and Kaitlan Moczulski, and I am grateful to the Rodney
J. Owens Memorial for providing funding. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my late colleague
Joseph Webb McKnight, who devoted his career to legal history and family law reform.
' 2 JOHN EBERLE, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 160 (1831) (emphasis omitted). On
the life and influence of Dr. Eberle, see Thomas D. Mitchell, John Eberle, in LIVES OF EMINENT
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 460, 460-78 (Samuel D. Gross
ed., 1861).
2 EBERLE, supra note 1, at 161 n.1.
3 Id.
4 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
90 (5th ed., text rev. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (defining a subtype of delusional disorder that "applies
when the central theme of the delusion involves the person's belief that he or she is being conspired
against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned, or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed
in the pursuit of long-term goals").
derangement."' Under traditional law, if the barber entered into a contract
that was premised on his false belief regarding his neighbors' intentions,
such a contract would be voidable at the barber's option.6 If the barber
attempted to make a gift or devise because of his delusion, that transfer
would be invalid;' however, the barber could enter into enforceable contracts
with regard to matters unconnected with his erroneous beliefs, and he could,
at least in theory, make a gift or execute a will provided that it was not the
product of his delusion.9
Over the past few decades, newer tests of mental capacity have emerged
in contract law that are more attuned to developments in psychiatry and do
not focus on cognitive impairments.'o Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, the fairness of the transaction is an important concern."
However, in the law of gratuitous transfers, the traditional insane delusion
doctrine remains firmly entrenched, and scholars have begun to criticize its
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. s
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS] (defining an
insane delusion for purposes of determining the validity of a donative transfer). The doctrine of insane
delusion may apply even when the testator has "an otherwise high degree of intelligence." WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 316 (4th ed. 2010). Ironically, this doctrine became
prominent in American courts during an age when "confidence in human ability soared to unprecedented
heights." See SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE 10-12 (2016) (explaining the contradictions that
preoccupied Gilded Age thinkers who had to wrestle with issues of mental capacity).
6 See, e.g., Weller v. Copeland, 120 N.E. 578, 583 (111. 1918) ("[[]f the monomania or delusion is
so connected with the subject-matter of the agreement as to render one of the parties thereto incapable of
understanding the nature or effect of the contract or of acting rationally in the transaction, it is thereby
rendered voidable at the option of the party so afflicted.").
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. s (affirming that
a donative transfer is invalid "to the extent that it was the product of an insane delusion"); see also
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 5, at 317.
' See Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 168 P.2d 256, 260 (Colo. 1946) (upholding validity of sale not
affected by seller's insane delusion); cf Weller, 120 N.E. at 583 ("[A] monomania or delusion
unconnected with the subject-matter of the contract does not destroy its binding force").
'See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. s; MCGOVERN ET
AL., supra note 5, at 317.
0 See, e.g., Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 302 (Mass. 2012) (describing the "modem"
test as one recognizing "that competence can be lost, not only through cognitive disorders, but through
affective disorders that encompass motivation or exercise of will"); Ortelere v. Teachers' Ret. Bd., 250
N.E.2d 460,462 (N.Y. 1969) ("[I]ncapacity to contract or exercise contractual rights may exist, because
of volitional and affective impediments or disruptions in the personality, despite the intellectual or
cognitive ability to understand.").
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Where the
contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without knowledge of the mental illness or defect,
the power of avoidance . .. terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in whole or
in part or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be unjust."); see also id § 15 cmt. b
("Where a person has some understanding of a particular transaction which is affected by mental illness
or defect, the controlling consideration is whether the transaction in its result is one which a reasonably
competent person might have made.").
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application there as flawed, redundant, and inconsistent.12 According to this
view, the doctrine of insane delusion does testators more harm than good,
particularly in jurisdictions that allow amateur jurors to inject their own
personal biases into the process.13 Some argue that courts hearing will
contests should focus on the general question of mental capacity, although
the presence or absence of certain types of delusions might be relevant in
determining whether a testator was of sound mind.14 Others have proposed
that a will be considered partially invalid when some, but not all, of the
testamentary gifts were affected by an insane delusion."
Due to the nature of gratuitous transfers, adoption of the fairness-based
approach to mental illness in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is not a
feasible alternative to the traditional insane-delusion doctrine for wills and
12 See, e.g., Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely Insane Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of
Monomania on Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 67, 68-71 (2007) (criticizing the
insane-delusion doctrine because the laws that surround it are largely over- and under-inclusive); Alan J.
Oxford, 11, Salvaging Testamentary Intent by Applying Partial Invalidity to Insane Delusions, 12
APPALACHIAN J.L. 83, 88 (2012) (arguing that "[clourts should reexamine how they view insane
delusions and be willing to partially void a will in lieu of completely destroying it"); Amy D. Ronner,
Does Golyadkin Really Have a Double? Dostoevsky Debunks the Mental Capacity and Insane Delusion
Doctrines, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 195, 260-61 (2012) (discussing how the doctrine of insane delusion might
best be reformed). Although scholarship on the insane-delusion doctrine has not focused on its
application in the law of contracts, some of the problems that have been identified in the context of
gratuitous transfers apply equally well to contractual arrangements. By contrast, much has been written
about the doctrine of insane delusion in criminal law, but the purpose of the doctrine (exculpating a
defendant with regard to one specific act) is very different in the criminal context. This Article will focus
on the insane delusion doctrine as applied to voluntary transfers and transactions.
" See, e.g., Fogel, supra note 12, at 100-01 (discussing how parts of the test for monomania are
flawed and how factfinders disregard evidence showing the intent of the testator and instead insert their
own biases into the cases). Similar problems of bias have been noted with regard to the doctrine of undue
influence. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARJZ. L. REV. 235, 236-37,
245-46 (1996) (reporting that "determinations often are more dependent on courts' normative views of
the relationships between the testator, beneficiary and contestant than by the actual presence or absence
of factors often deemed indicative of undue influence"); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence,
81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 589-92 (1997) (explaining that devises to family members are rarely treated as
"unnatural," while devises to non-family members may be taken as evidence of undue influence); Carla
Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
245, 280-86 (2010) (discussing the "blinders" courts put on when applying the traditional doctrine of
undue influence). On the disadvantages of trial by jury in will contests, see John H. Langbein, Will
Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043 (1994) (reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE
EpIc BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)).
14 Compare Fogel, supra note 12, at 111 (arguing that "[t]he doctrine of monomania should be
abrogated in favor of the general test for testamentary capacity"), with Ronner, supra note 12, at 261
(suggesting that the test incorporate "an added mandate that a mentally incompetent testator must also
suffer from what the DSM defines as bizarre delusions").
15 See, e.g., 1 PAGE ON WILLS § 12.47 (2015) ("The better view, and apparently the weight of
authority, is to the effect, that under such circumstances, a will may be valid as to the gifts which were
not affected by the insane delusion and invalid as to the gifts which were affected by the insane
delusion."); Oxford, supra note 12, at 121 ("Courts utilizing the doctrine of partial invalidity can correct
the effect of the insane delusion by partially voiding the offending provisions, and by appropriately
protecting the sanctity of a testator's testamentary freedom and wishes, by preserving those gifts
unaffected by the insane delusion.").
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trusts.'" The reform of contract law does, however, provide a precedent for
looking to modem psychiatry for guidance.17 Among psychiatrists and
scientific researchers, the concept of a delusion is far from obsolete. The
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V)
used by psychiatrists and other experts recognizes a category of "delusional
disorder" in which, "[a]part from the impact of the delusion(s) or its
ramifications, functioning is not markedly impaired."" Although some
individuals with a delusional disorder go on to develop schizophrenia, the
"diagnosis is generally stable."l9 Recent scientific studies have shown
correlations between delusions and other cognitive impairments.20
Nevertheless, there is evidence that not all deluded individuals have
additional cognitive biases, and those who do may have some impairments
while lacking others.21
Courts should not be too quick to abandon a concept that continues to
have relevance for the scientists and doctors who deal with mental illness on
a daily basis. This Article will accordingly propose a new use for the concept
of a delusion in making legal determinations regarding mental capacity in
the context of wills. The concept would be better formulated as a doctrine of
partial sanity, used when a testator is found to lack general mental capacity,
and only as a basis for upholding all or part of a will. Under such a rule, the
issue of a testator's general mental capacity would be decided first. If the
person in question had general mental capacity, the will would be held valid.
But if the person did lack general mental capacity, the court would consider
whether the testator was capable of making some rational decisions. To the
extent that a particular decision was the product of rational decision making,
the testator would be deemed to have had the capacity to make that decision.
This would preserve, in modified form, a legal concept that has existed for
"A person who lacks the capacity to execute a will also lacks the capacity to create a testamentary
trust, and the same standard is increasingly applied to revocable trusts. See 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr,
WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 3.2 (4th ed.
2006).
" See Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 302 (Mass. 2012) (explaining how "the traditional
test for contractual incapacity . . . evolved to incorporate an increased understanding of the nature of
mental illness in its various forms").
8 DSM-V, supra note 4, at 90.
* Id. at 92-93.
20 See, e.g., Richard P. Bentall et al., The Cognitive and Affective Structure ofParanoid Delusions,
66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 236, 243-44 (2009) (finding a correlation between paranoid delusions
and impaired cognitive performance); Lars 0. White & Warren Mansell, Failing to Ponder? Delusion-
Prone Individuals Rush to Conclusions, CLINICAL PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 111, 121-22 (2009)
(finding a "tendency of delusion-prone individuals to strike decisions after collecting less data than
controls").
21 See, e.g., Susannah May Colbert et al., Jumping to Conclusions and Perceptions in Early
Psychosis: Relationship with Delusional Beliefs, 15 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 422, 423, 438
(2010) (finding that individuals with delusions were no more likely to jump to conclusions, but were
more likely to identify "an ambiguous perceptual event as external and real, rather than internal and
imaginary").
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centuries and remains relevant in modem science, without giving excessive
license to courts and juries to second-guess the lifestyles and eccentricities
of individuals.
This Article is divided into three parts. Section I will examine the history
and current application of the doctrine of insane delusion in the law of
contracts and donative transfers. Section [1 will discuss the historical and
current scientific understanding of delusions and their relationship with
other cognitive impairments. Section III will then consider how current law
might be reformed to reflect the current state of scientific knowledge while
addressing the criticisms that have been made of the legal doctrine of insane
delusion.
1. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF INSANE DELUSION
The doctrine of insane delusion entered the common law in the
nineteenth century as an embrace of a concept that was, at the time, cutting-
edge science. Since that time, however, the doctrine has come unmoored
from its scientific origins. In the field of contracts, the case law has gradually
abandoned the doctrine in favor of other, more sophisticated tests. In the
context of donative transfers, the doctrine has come under attack from
commentators who argue that it provides an unnecessary second opportunity
forjurors to insert their own biases into assessments of mental capacity. This
Section will provide some background on the origins of the legal doctrine of
insane delusion as well as recent criticism of the doctrine.
A. Origins of the Legal Doctrine ofInsane Delusion
Although the concept of partial insanity was mentioned by English
courts as early as 1790,22 the first clear application of the doctrine was in the
1822 case of Dew v. Clark, which involved a plea by a daughter to challenge
her father's will.23 According to the daughter, Charlotte Mary Dew, her
father Ely Stott "laboured under great and continued delusion of mind"
regarding her, "declaring, whilst she was in her earliest infancy, that she was
invested by nature with a singular depravity-was born to become the
22 See Greenwood v. Greenwood (1790), 163 Eng. Rep. 930; 3 Curt. 868. As noted by Bradley
Fogel, the facts of Greenwood actually involved the distinct concept of a lucid interval, although
Greenwood was nonetheless cited in Dew v. Clark, the first case to apply the actual insane-delusion
doctrine. See Fogel, supra note 12, at 83. The Greenwood decision was frequently cited in judicial
opinions and treatises in the nineteenth century but was generally regarded as wrongly decided. See
BLUMENTHAL, supra note 5, at 115-16,323 n.22.
23 The Dew case actually appears three times in the English Reports. The first opinion, in 1822, was
followed by two subsequent opinions issued in 1824 and 1826, respectively. Dew v. Clark (1822) (Dew
1), 162 Eng. Rep. 98; 1 Add. 279; Dew v. Clark (1824) (Dew Il), 162 Eng. Rep. 233; 2 Add. 102; Dew
v. Clark (1826) (Dew Ill), 162 Eng. Rep. 410, 455; 3 Add. 79; Fogel, supra note 12, at 83 n.95.
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peculiar victim of vice and evil-was the special property of Satan."2 4 The
testator's nephews responded to this claim by asserting that the alleged
delusion could not amount to a lack of general testamentary capacity as
defined by law.25 The Prerogative Court rejected this defense, holding that
partial insanity might in fact invalidate a will.26 However, the court also
emphasized that the daughter could prevail only by proving "that the
deceased was insane as to her, notwithstanding his general sanity."27 In a
subsequent opinion, the court concluded that the decedent did indeed have a
"morbid delusion" with respect to his daughter that rendered the will
invalid.28
The Prerogative Court did not incorporate any scientific justification in
Dew for its conclusion that partial insanity could invalidate a will. In the
1830 case of Fulleck v. Allinson, however, the Prerogative Court made
reference to a scientific concept that had recently gained currency, namely,
that of "monomania."29 The contestant in Fulleck alleged that the testator
falsely believed that his well had been poisoned by his niece's husband."o
Like the barber from Lancaster in John Eberle's medical treatise,"1 the
testator continued to have sound judgment with regard to all other subjects.32
Thus, the Fulleck court reasoned, the testator's alleged delusion would
properly be classified as "a monomania."33 Nevertheless, because the
alleged delusion seemed to have a reasonable basis in fact (for example, the
evidence showed that the testator's dog had actually been poisoned), the
court ultimately rejected the contest and allowed the will to be probated.34
American courts embraced both the scientific concept of monomania
and the legal doctrine of insane delusion, which they applied not only in will
contests, but also in cases involving contract disputes. In the 1846 case of
Alston v. Boyd," the Supreme Court of Tennessee set aside a contract on the
ground that the plaintiff s "distinctly established monomania" regarding evil
spirits in his house may have influenced his agreement to exchange land with
the defendant.3 6 Seven years later, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed the validity of a deed executed by a grantor who was "laboring
a Dew 1, 162 Eng. Rep. at 98.
25 Id. at 99.
26 Id at 99 (citing Greenwood, 163 Eng. Rep. 930).
27 Id. at 100.
28 Dew III, 162 Eng. Rep. at 455.
29 Fulleck v. Allinson (1830), 162 Eng. Rep. 1251, 1252; 3 Hagg. Ecc. 527, 530.
30id
3' See EBERLE, supra note 1, at 161-62 n.t (describing the functional monomania of a Lancaster
barber). On the concept of monomania in early psychiatry, see infra Section II.
32 Fulleck, 162 Eng. Rep. at 1257; 3 Hagg. Ecc. at 542.
33 Id.
1 162 Eng. Rep. at 1258; 3 Hagg. Ecc. at 545-47.
" 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 504 (1846).
36 Id. at 505-08.
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under monomania, but upon a subject in nowise connected with affairs of
this nature."37 In 1857, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a jury
instruction defining monomania as "a species of insanity ... confined to a
particular faculty of the mind, or existing in reference to a particular
subject," and limiting the defense to contracts entered into "under the
influence of [an insane] delusion."38
The application of the doctrine of insane delusion in nineteenth-century
cases occasionally shows what might be regarded as an enlightened attitude
toward the mentally ill. Judges in insane delusion cases were not always
swayed by any social stigma that might have been felt by those who were
committed to mental hospitals or who exhibited delusional behavior. For
example, in 1874, an Illinois man was held to be capable of entering into a
contract despite having spent time in "the lunatic asylum" because "in many
forms of insanity, the capacity to transact business is entirely unaffected."39
In 1880, an Iowa man who was found to be "laboring under some insane
delusions upon the subject of religion" was nevertheless held to have
executed a valid deed.40 In these cases, the concept of monomania was
applied to protect the rights of persons who exhibited signs of mental illness.
A good illustration of how far nineteenth-century judges were willing to
go to uphold the choices of delusional individuals may be found in the 1892
case of Lewis v. Arbuckle.4 1 Shortly before her death, Margaret Walsh had
conveyed eighty acres of land to two of her children.42 Margaret, who was
eighty years old, exhibited a number of bizarre tendencies:
She had for a long time an hallucination that she could see
fairies; conversed with them; set the table for them; thought
sticks of stove wood fairies; wanted to keep on the good side
of them; imagined she could see departed spirits, particularly
of her children; imagined she could see their whitened bones,
and could not be led to believe but that some of them were
dead; called people's attention to seeing their spirits out in the
road.43
Despite Margaret's hallucinations and eccentric beliefs, several witnesses
testified that she was nevertheless capable of exercising good judgment in
her business affairs.44 The court held that Margaret's beliefs did not render
her conveyance invalid, noting that "[m]any persons believe in spiritual
37 Boyce's Adm'r v. Smith, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 704, 707 (1853).
38 Gillespie v. Shuliberrier, 50 N.C. 157, 159 (1857).
3 Searle v. Galbraith, 73 Ill. 269, 271-72 (1874).
o Burgess v. Pollock, 5 N.W. 179, 181 (Iowa 1880).
4' 52 N.W. 237 (Iowa 1892).
42 Id. at 238.
43 Id. at 239.
4 Id.
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manifestations, insist that they have communication and conversations with
deceased friends, and the like," but such beliefs did not render them "unfit
to make a disposition of their property."45
B. Insane Delusions in Contract Law
Although the concept of insane delusion was applied in cases involving
wills as well as contracts, the consequences of a finding of mental incapacity
were quite different in the two categories of cases. Wills were gratuitous,
and their validity did not (at least in theory) depend on fairness. If a testator
lacked mental capacity at the time the will was executed, whether due to an
insane delusion or otherwise, the will or any infected portion of it would be
invalid.46 By contrast, contracts were two-way transactions for
consideration. This raised a number of questions that were absent in the wills
context. What would happen if one of the contracting parties was unaware
of the other's incapacity? Could the contract be set aside even if it was fair
and executed in good faith? And what if the mentally incompetent person
subsequently regained capacity and wished to ratify the contract?
Early U.S. decisions on the subject of agreements and transactions made
by mentally incompetent persons fell into two broad categories. According
to one line of cases, it was impossible for a mentally incompetent person to
enter into a valid contract.47 As the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned in
1900, "[o]ne of the essential elements to the validity of a contract is the
concurring assent of two minds. If one of the parties to a contract is insane
at the time of its execution, this essential element is wanting."' This line of
argument was supported by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1872 decision in
Dexter v. Hall,49 which held that a power of attorney executed by a mentally
incompetent person was not merely voidable, but void."
Most U.S. courts rejected the view that contracts entered into by a
" Id at 239-40. Many cemeteries established in the nineteenth century included features designed
to "promote a close association between the living and the dead," such as walking paths between small
sections of plots, small monuments that required maintenance by family members, and benches for
reflection. Albert N. Hamscher, Death and Dying in History, in TEACHING DEATH AND DYING 155, 161-
62 (Christopher M. Moreman ed., 2008).
46 See Dew III, 162 Eng. Rep. at 455.
" See I SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 250 n.8 (1920) ("[1]t was decided in early
English cases that a lunatic could not execute a deed, nor a bond, nor indorse a bill of exchange. And so
a funily settlement made by a lunatic was set aside, although it was reasonable and for the convenience
of the family. In accordance with this view it is held in many cases, especially those of not very recent
times, that a lunatic's contract or deed is absolutely void.").
4 Daugherty v. Powe, 30 So. 524, 525 (Ala. 1900).
4 82 U.S. 9 (1872).
' Id. at 26. The Supreme Court later clarified that its decision did not apply to all transactions by
mentally incompetent persons. See Luhrs v. Hancock, 181 U.S. 567, 574 (1901) ("The deed of an insane
person is not absolutely void; it is only voidable; that is, it may be confirmed or set aside.").
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mentally incompetent person were void, holding them to be voidable only."1
Courts taking the latter position pointed to the treatment of minors, whose
contracts were generally held to be voidable, not void, even though they
were not able to offer meaningful consent.52 Although the analogy was
imperfect, it was sufficiently persuasive to establish enforceability, subject
to avoidance by or on behalf of the mentally incompetent party, as the
majority rule.53 However, this raised a second issue. If a contract could be
enforced at the option of the mentally incompetent party, was it fair to deny
the other contracting party any right of enforcement?
In the leading case of Molton v. Camroux,54 the English Court of
Exchequer held that an executed contract could not be set aside on the basis
of mental incompetency when the allegedly incompetent party appeared to
be of sound mind and the contract was fair and made in good faith." The
Molton rule was widely followed in the United States in jurisdictions that
considered contracts of mentally incompetent persons to be voidable. 6
Although U.S. courts would generally decline to enforce an executory
contract made by an incompetent person," they were reluctant to set aside
executed contracts in the absence of bad faith or unfairness. As noted by
Susanna Blumenthal, American judges did not want to admit to the public,
or to themselves, that they were "violating the hallowed ideal of mutual
assent."" Unless the consideration could be refunded and the status quo
restored for the other contracting party, U.S. judges concluded that it would
be inequitable to set aside a fair and bona fide agreement.59
Beginning in the first half of the twentieth century, some judges and
commentators began to notice difficulties of interpretation and application
s' See I WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 269 & nn.86-87
(1913) (citing the opinions of U.S. courts to support the proposition that the contracts of mentally
incompetent persons are voidable "except when for necessaries").
52 See, e.g., Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N.J.L. 108, 117 (1874) ("[DJeeds or instruments under seal executed
by infants, are voidable only, with the exception of those which delegate a naked authority.").
" See I WILLISTON, supra note 47, at § 251 (referring to voidability as "the view more commonly
expressed").
' Molton v. Camroux (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 584; 2 Ex. 487.
"Id. at 590.
56 See, e.g., I WILLISTON, supra note 47, § 254 (citing numerous cases recognizing the Molton rule).
" See Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60, 64-65 (1858) (noting that courts generally will not enforce
executory contracts entered into by parties that are "incapable"); I WILLISTON, supra note 47, § 254
(noting exceptions for executory contracts and contracts where the consideration could be refunded).
* BLUMENTHAL, supra note 5, at 183.
* See Coburn v. Raymond, 57 A. 116, 117 (Conn. 1904) (observing that the majority of cases
suggest that a "deed cannot be set aside on the ground of the grantor's incompetency where the grantee
acted in ignorance of the incompetency, and fairly and in good faith"); Young v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 133,
136-37 (1868) (basing the court's holding on the well-accepted principle that where a contract is entered
into in good faith, it will be upheld); Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N.J.L. 108, 118 (1874) (noting that other courts
have held that where "persons apparently of sound mind and not known to be otherwise, enter into a
contract which is fair and bonafide," the "contract cannot be set aside").
2017] 901
with respect to the legal doctrine of insane delusion for both contracts and
wills. As early as 1905, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that "[m]edical
men of great learning maintain that a mind diseased on one subject must be
classed as unsound," but nonetheless considered itself bound by its prior
precedent to affirm the legal doctrine of insane delusion.60 In 1935, the
Illinois Supreme Court found at least three separate definitions of "insane
delusion" in prior case law.6' The court ultimately concluded that the
decedent in the case was influenced by an insane delusion without adopting
any particular definition.6 2
The decades after the First World War witnessed the rise of Legal
Realism, a school of thought that questioned the nineteenth-century
understanding of law as a science.63 Realists questioned whether the stated
reasons offered by judges to support their decisions were the real reasons,
suggesting that other factors were often determinative.' In the early 1940s,
law professor Milton Green published a series of articles applying a Realist
critique to traditional legal doctrines relating to mental capacity.6' Green's
principal criticism of the doctrine of insane delusion, and other current tests
of capacity, was that such tests were inherently subjective and asked
questions about state of mind that were impossible for judges to answer.66
Green argued that, despite the stated application of objective standards,
judicial decisions regarding capacity were actually based on objective
assessments of behavior that were analogous to diagnoses made by
psychiatrists. 6' To support this claim, Green pointed to cases where the
"unnatural" nature of a particular contract or will was mentioned to justify a
' Sayre v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 90 S.W. 787, 797 (Mo. 1905).
6! Eubanks v. Eubanks, 195 N.E. 521, 526 (Ill. 1935).
62 Id.
6 See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 15-
21 (1995) (summarizing the traditional account of the Realist movement).
6 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 112 (1930) (discussing various factors-such
as personality, education, and environment-that may influence judicial decision making).
65 See Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law ofMental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1189, 1192 (1940) (discussing the legal conceptions of mental incompetency and the public policies
behind them); Milton D. Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 MO. L. REV. 141, 141-42
(1941) [hereinafter Green, Judicial Tests] (addressing when "mental unsoundness" is "sufficient to
destroy contractual or testamentary capacity"); Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental
Incompetency-A Study in Related Concepts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 177 (1943) (analyzing the legal
concepts of fraud, undue influence, and mental incompetency in connection with contracts and wills);
Milton D. Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 TEX. L.
REV. 554, 554 (1943) (discussing the operative effect of mental incompetency in the context of wills and
agreements); Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53
YALE L.J. 271, 274 (1944) [hereinafter Green, ProoA (questioning whether judicial tests ofincompetency
are useful tools despite their "defects," and whether there is an "inarticulate standard" that somehow
justifies the decisions made by courts).
' See Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 65, at 161 (arguing that courts can infer an individual's
state of mind "but they can never know," and thus "[t]he task which they have set themselves is an
impossible one").
67 Id at 160-64.
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determination that it was motivated by an insane delusion." According to
Green, the "real standard of mental incompetence" was not expressed by the
judges and focused on "the fairness or the unfairness of the transaction."69
Green's criticism of traditional capacity doctrine proved to be very
influential in the future development of contract law. In 1979, the American
Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
contained a new provision, Section 15, on "Mental Illness or Defect:"
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by
entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or
defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the
nature and consequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation
to the transaction and the other party has reason to know
of his condition.
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other
party is without knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the
power of avoidance under Subsection (1) terminates to the
extent that the contract has been so performed in whole or in
part or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance
would be unjust. In such a case a court may grant relief as
justice requires.7 0
This new section made explicit the objective considerations that Green had
considered to be the real standard for mental incompetence. Comment (b) of
the new provision clarified that when a party had "some understanding of a
particular transaction which is affected by mental illness or defect, the
controlling consideration is whether the transaction in its result is one which
a reasonably competent person might have made."" As justification for the
new section, the Reporter's Note cited several of Green's articles among
other authorities.72
The objective test of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has
gradually displaced the traditional doctrine of insane delusion in modern
contract law. Under the modem approach, the presence of delusions has no
special relevance toward the determination of whether a contract is valid.
An example of this may be seen in the 1989 case of Farnum v. Silvano,73
6 Green, Proof supra note 65, at 280-81.
6 1Id. at311.
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 11, § 15.
" Id. § 15 cmt. (b).
71 Id. § 15 reporter's note.
7 540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
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which involved a challenge to a sale allegedly agreed to by a mentally ill
nonagenarian. Viola Farnum, who sold her house in Massachusetts to Joseph
Silvano in 1986, suffered from several apparent delusions, believing, for
example, that her dead sisters were still alive and her one-story house had
an upstairs.74 Nonetheless, the word "delusion" appears nowhere in the
opinion of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts's holding that Viola lacked
the capacity to contract. Instead, the court repeatedly notes that the sale price
for the house was about half its fair market value.75 Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts test,7 6 in light of the unfairness of the transaction, it
was irrelevant whether Viola's alleged delusions caused her to sell the
property.
C. Insane Delusions in the Law of Donative Transfers
In contrast to contract law, the law of wills and other donative transfers
is built around the fundamental principle that, absent some controlling public
policy to the contrary, an individual may dispose of his or her property
without regard to fairness. As explained by the Restatement (Third) of
Donative Transfers, "American law does not grant courts any general
authority to question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor's
decisions about how to allocate his or her property."n This principle has
been traditionally justified as creating an incentive for work and savings."
74 Id at 203.
s Id. at 203, 205.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 11, § 15.
n RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 10.1 cmt. c. For criticism of
this longstanding policy, see RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD
HAND 82 (2007) ("The glue of the traditional family is biological connection, sometimes supplemented
by adoption. . . . American 'exceptionalism' is now too often exemplified by excessive regard for the
individualistic whims of parents to the possible detriment of their children."); Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't
Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for a Change to a System of
Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1197 (1990) ("As sacred and fundamental as the [parent-
child] bond maybe ... it is consistently abandoned whenever it clashes with another fundamental concept
imbedded in America's social and legal structure: testamentary freedom.").
' See, e.g., THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 34 (2d ed. 1953) (arguing
that limitations on testamentary freedom would "discourage individual initiative and thrift," since people
would have less of an incentive to accumulate property if they could not choose who would receive it
after death); Jeremy Bentham, Principles ofthe Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 297,
338 (Bowring ed. 1838-1843) (suggesting that individuals would become spendthrifts, purchase
annuities, or spend all their money during life if they could not devise it by will); I FRANCIS HUTCHESON,
A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 352 (1755) (claiming that "industry should be much discouraged" if
the right of testation were eliminated); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 53 (4th ed. 1919)
("[T]he abrogation of the power of bequest would remove from [the individual] an important inducement
to the exercise of industry and thrift in advancing years."). The argument has been made since at least
the thirteenth century. See 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181 (George E.
Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., 1968) (original work c. 1230) ("[A] citizen could
scarcely be found who would undertake a great enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was compelled
against his will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and undeserving wives."). On the
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As a practical matter, this principle is not always strictly followed, and the
rules may be applied by judges and juries in such a way as to second-guess
the testator's decisions. 79 However, the explicit introduction of a fairness-
based test with regard to mental capacity issues would threaten the core
doctrine underlying the law of gratuitous transfers and offer more
opportunities for factfinders to inject their own personal biases into the
process. In the absence of a fairness-based alternative, the nineteenth-
century insane-delusion doctrine lives on in cases involving will contests,
raising a number of doctrinal and practical problems.
1. Mental Capacity in the Third Restatement
The Restatement (Third) of Donative Transfers addresses mental
capacity in Section 8.1. The first paragraph of Section 8.1 states generally
that "[a] person must have mental capacity in order to make or revoke a
donative transfer."" If the donative transfer takes the form of a will or will
substitute, the testator must be capable of understanding
[t]he nature and extent of his or her property, the natural
objects of his or her bounty, and the disposition that he or she
is making of that property, and must also be capable of relating
these elements to one another and forming an orderly desire
regarding the disposition of the property.si
If the testator cannot satisfy this general test of mental capacity, the will is
void.82
The doctrine of insane delusion is not addressed in the text of Section
8.1 of the Restatement (Third) of Donative Transfers. A comment to the
other hand, as Hirsch and Wang have noted, many individuals acquire wealth "to gratify their egos, to
gain prestige, to gain power-and simply out of habit. Once these impulses are taken into account, the
economic contributions traceable to freedom of testation could turn out to be small." Adam J. Hirsch &
William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1992). For a general
discussion of this and other arguments in favor of freedom of testation, see Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving
and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 129, 156-70 (2008).
' See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational
Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 586-608 (1999) (explaining how courts may manipulate undue influence
and will formalities statutes so as to protect members of the testator's family). The problem seems
particularly acute with respect to undue influence cases. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 13, at 243-44
(arguing that courts tend to find undue influence only when the beneficiary is not related to the testator);
Madoff, supra note 13, at 602 (noting that bequests in favor of the spouse or blood relatives are unlikely
to be overturned on undue influence grounds); Spivack, supra note 13, at 280-86 (citing recent cases to
demonstrate that "the vagueness of the undue influence doctrine still leaves the door open to courts
imposing their ideology-driven views of morality and propriety upon the will of the testator").
* RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1(a).
"' Id. § 8.1(b). In the case of an irrevocable gift, the donor must satisfy this test and "must also be
capable of understanding the effect that the gift may have on the future financial security of the donor
and of anyone who may be dependent on the donor." Id. § 8.1 cmt. d.
82 Id. § 8.1 cmt. c.
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section, however, defines an insane delusion as "a belief that is so against
the evidence and reason that it must be the product of derangement." 83 The
comment clarifies that "[m]ere eccentricity does not constitute an insane
delusion," and "[a] belief resulting from a process of reasoning from existing
facts is not an insane delusion, even though the reasoning is imperfect or the
conclusion illogical."8 4 Nevertheless, even though a person who "suffers
from an insane delusion is not necessarily deprived of capacity to make a
donative transfer," a donative transfer will be invalid "to the extent that it
was the product of an insane delusion."85
The Restatement definition of insane delusion raises two difficult
issues-one relating to the definition of an insane delusion and the other
relating to the consequences of such a delusion. First, how are courts to
determine whether a belief is "so against the evidence and reason that it must
be the product of derangement?" Is the test satisfied if there is even a slight
possibility that the delusion might be based in fact? Second, how is a court
to determine whether a will was "the product of an insane delusion" when
the testator is dead and cannot explain the reasons for his or her testamentary
choices? Courts have wrestled with these issues for years, with inconsistent
and sometimes dubious results.86 As Bradley Fogel and others have shown,
both components of the insane delusion test are difficult to apply, partly
because factfinders sometimes disregard factual evidence supporting a
testator's choices when the result fails to comport with their own notions of
fairness.87
2. The Legal Definition ofDelusion
In some cases, it is not difficult to reach a determination that the testator
was suffering from an insane delusion. A good example of this is In re Estate
" Id. § 8.1 cmt. s.
SId.; see also Dibble v. Currier, 83 S.E. 949, 950 (Ga. 1914) ("[A] bad reasoner, even one wanting
in ordinary discernment or discrimination, is not necessarily insane."); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 5,
at 316 ("Contests based upon an insane delusion do not often succeed in upsetting a will, because a
testator's mistaken belief is not an 'insane delusion' if there was some rational basis for it.").
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. s; see also
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 5, at 317 ("In order for the challenge to succeed the will must be the
product of the insane delusion. In other words, the terms of the will must be explainable by reference to
the insane delusion.").
* See Fogel, supra note 12, at 86-101 (discussing several cases involving mental capacity).
8 See id. at 101 (arguing that "fact-finders disregard evidence that could have been the basis of the
testator's delusion based on their own biases," and the requirement that the will be a product of the insane
delusion "forces fact-finders to determine what the testator was thinking when he executed his will,"
which "is an impossible factual determination"); see also Oxford, supra note 12, at 97 ("The difficulty
with the 'no factual basis' standard is that all delusions are based in some fact."); Note, Testamentary
Capacity as Affected By Insane Delusions, 26 IND. L.J. 291, 302 (1951) (noting that "many instances are
found in which the court, anxious to uphold a disposition, attempted to show that no delusion existed" in
spite of "almost unsurmountable evidence to the contrary," while in other cases "clearly irrelevant
delusions have been allowed to void a will").
906 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:891
PERSONAL REALITY: DELUSION IN LA WAND SCIENCE
ofZielinski," a 1995 New York case that is often cited as an example of how
a paranoid delusion can invalidate a testator's will.89 Cecilia Zielinski, the
decedent in the case, had executed a will devising her residuary estate to her
sister, Barbara Moczulski, and Barbara's husband in equal shares, and
disinheriting her son, Eugene Zielinski, along with all other lineal
descendants, including two grandchildren and five great-grandchildren. 9 0
Upon Cecilia's death, Barbara offered the will to probate, and Eugene
contested it on the ground that Cecilia lacked testamentary capacity. 9' At the
trial, two psychiatrists testified along with some of Cecilia's employees and
other acquaintances, calling attention to a number of bizarre beliefs that
Cecilia had concerning her son and others.92
According to the trial witnesses, Cecilia thought that her son had
performed unauthorized medical procedures upon her, including injecting
her in the buttocks and placing balloons in her stomach. 93 She also believed
that she was "getting instructions from a 'device' that turned the world inside
out."'94 The Surrogate's Court denied Barbara's petition to probate the will,
and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding "that the testimony fully
supports the conclusion that decedent was suffering from an insane delusion
regarding her son and that this delusion directly affected her decision not to
leave anything to him under her will."95 The court also found that, although
the delusions might explain why Cecilia excluded her son from the will,
"there was no evidence presented of any reasonable basis for the delusion."96
Given the bizarre nature of Cecilia's beliefs regarding her son, the court
in Zielinski had no difficulty finding an insane delusion. In many cases,
however, the alleged delusion involves a belief that might well be true
depending on the facts. For example, a large number of insane-delusion
cases involve a belief that the decedent's spouse or former spouse was
unfaithful in marriage, and such beliefs can be difficult to disprove. 97 The
" 623 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
89See id at 656 (holding that the decedent's insane delusions "directly affected her decision not to
leave anything to [her son] under her will"). For discussion of the case, see Fogel, supra note 12, at 108-
10; Oxford, supra note 12, at 91-92; Ronner, supra note 12, at 211-13.
'o Zielinski, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
91 Id.
9 Id. at 655.
9' See id (citing testimony regarding Cecilia's delusions from her psychiatrists Abdul Hameed and
Zoser Mohammed, her employees Patricia Russo and Donna Loro, and her son's ex-wife Jean Smith and
current wife Lynn Zielinski).
94 See id.
" Id. at 656.
96 Id.
" See Fogel, supra note 12, at 88-89 (citing cases that involve delusions of marital infidelity, such
as In re Kaven's Estate, 272 N.W. 696 (Mich. 1937) and In re Scott's Estate, 60 P. 527 (Cal. 1900));
Oxford, supra note 12, at 93-95 (noting that insane delusions may pertain to perceived spousal infidelity,
and discussing cases such as In re Honigman's Will, 168 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1960), In re Robertson's
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North Dakota case of Kingdon v. Sybrant,98 decided in 1968, is typical. The
decedent, Fred W. Kingdon, had devised $1,000 to Lotus Irene Komer, the
daughter of his first wife, and divided the balance of the estate between the
two children of his second wife.99 Lotus contested the will, arguing that it
was the product of a false belief that the decedent was not Lotus's father.' 00
A jury found that the will was invalid for lack of testamentary capacity, and
the proponents appealed.'o
According to the decedent's attorney, who testified at the trial, "it was
common talk" that the decedent's wife was having an affair with another
man named Sig Boeman.'0 2 The attorney also testified that the doctor who
delivered Lotus told the decedent that, while Lotus's mother was on the
delivery table, she had stated, "Sig, you shouldn't have done it."'0 3 Another
witness testified that the first wife's "reputation for morals in the community
was not all that it should have been."104 The North Dakota Supreme Court
granted a new trial, holding that the trial court had issued prejudicial
instructions placing the burden on the will proponents of proving that the
first wife was unfaithful, when the real issue was whether the decedent's
belief to the contrary "had any evidential basis."'
Cases like Kingdon, involving allegedly delusional beliefs concerning
marital infidelity, were difficult for courts to resolve before the development
of modern DNA testing. In the 1941 New York case of In re Hargrove's
Will,10 6 the court was tasked with determining whether ajury had sufficient
evidence to find that the testator, a "dignified, considerate gentleman" who
executed his will in 1923, was delusional in believing that the children born
to his ex-wife, Aimee Neresheimer, in 1902 and 1904, were not his. 0 7 The
testator's divorce from his wife in 1906 had "created a considerable scandal"
because the attorney who assisted in obtaining the divorce announced within
an hour of the entry of the decree that he planned to marry Aimee, and did
so a month later.'08
Speaking for a majority of the Appellate Division, Justice Townley held
that "it cannot be said that his belief on this subject was entirely without
Estate, 189 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1948), In re Estate ofCoffin, 246 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. Ct: App. Div. 1968),
and In re Hargrove's Will, 262 A.D. 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941)).
9 158 N.W. 2d 863 (N.D. 1968).
9 Id. at 865-66.
1n Id. at 866.
... Id. at 865.
02 Id. at 866.
03 Id.
04 
Id.
'os Id. at 867-69.
'0 28 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
07 Id. at 572-74.
'o Id. at 573-74.
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reason, although possibly mistaken." 09 However, in a vigorous dissent,
Justice Glennon argued that the jury had "ample testimony" to reach its
finding, noting that the testator had referred to the two disinherited children
as his in a 1907 affidavit to set aside the divorce. 10 A subsequent affidavit
executed in 1920, relied upon by the majority, made statements concerning
Aimee's reputation that seemed highly implausible in light of the fact that
she was only sixteen when the marriage took place."' Nevertheless, the will
was allowed to stand."12
Although modem DNA testing could have resolved the paternity issues
at the heart of Kingdon and Hargrove, it cannot help with other cases of
suspected infidelity when no children have been conceived as a result of the
alleged affair. As the leading case of In re Honigman's Will" 3 demonstrates,
the absence of tangible proof of the alleged affair can create more problems
than it solves." 4 A month before his death in 1956, Frank Honigman
executed a will that disinherited his wife of nearly forty years of all except
her minimum statutory share and devised the rest of his property to his
surviving siblings and their descendants."'5 Florence, the testator's widow,
contested the will on the ground that her husband was not of sound mind,
and the jury agreed."16
Frank was of the strong, and frequently expressed, belief that Florence
was not faithful to him in their marriage. At the trial, the will proponents
pointed to several "incidents" that might have justified Frank's belief."' One
incident "concerned an anniversary card sent by Mr. Krauss, a mutual
acquaintance and friend of many years, bearing a printed message of
congratulation in sweetly sentimental phraseology.""' This card "was
addressed to the wife alone and not received on the anniversary date. . . ."ll9
The evidence also showed that "whenever the house telephone rang Mrs.
Honigman would answer it."' 20 In addition, there was evidence of a dramatic
confrontation between the spouses:
'
09 Id. at 573.
'o Id. at 575, 576-77 (Glennon, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 578.
... See id at 575 (affirming the lower court's decision to allow the will to stand).
'" 168 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1960).
"
4See id at 677-78 (discussing the "proof' presented by Mr. Honigman to support his belief that
Mrs. Honigman was unfaithful in their marriage). For critical examination of the problems raised by
Honigman, see JESSE DUKEMINLER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 282-83 (9th
ed. 2013); STEWART E. STERK, MELANIE B. LESLIE, & JOEL C. DOBRIS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 437 (4th
ed. 2011); Fogel, supra note 12, at 95-96; Oxford, supra note 12, at 93-94; Ronner, supra note 12, at
222-25.
1"1 Honigman, 168 N.E.2d at 676-77.
"
6 Id. at 677.
"Id. at 677-78.
"' Id. at 678.
"9 Id.
120 Id
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Mrs. Honigman asked the decedent as he was leaving the
house what time she might expect him to return. This aroused
his suspicion. He secreted himself at a vantage point in a
nearby park and watched his home. He saw Mr. Krauss enter
and, later, when he confronted his wife with knowledge of this
incident, she allegedly asked him for a divorce.12 '
The court noted that the alleged incident in the park "was taken entirely from
a statement made by Mr. Honigman to one of the witnesses. Mrs. Honigman
flatly denied all of it."' 22
3. Problems of Causation and Personal Bias
In light of the conflicting evidence, the majority in Honigman held that
there was a sufficient basis to support the jury's finding that Frank had no
reasonable basis for believing that his wife was unfaithful. 123 This did not
end the analysis, however. The will proponents argued that Frank's decision
to disinherit his wife could be justified on other grounds: Florence was
independently wealthy and the residuary legatees had greater financial
needs. 2 4 Quoting an earlier New York case, the Honigman majority rejected
these arguments on the ground that the will was invalid because it "might
have been caused or affected by the delusion."1 25 Judge Fuld dissented,
arguing that "the evidence adduced utterly failed to prove that the testator
was suffering from an insane delusion or lacked testamentary capacity." 26
The standard articulated in Honigman, which would treat a will as
invalid when its provisions "might have been" caused by an insane delusion,
is not the majority rule.' 27 However, other courts have struggled with the
concept of causation in insane delusion cases. In the 1947 case, In re
Strittmater's Estate,128 a testator in New Jersey devised her property to the
National Woman's Party, an organization that fought for women's rights.1 2 9
121 Id.
122 Id.
I23 Id
124 Id at 679.
12 Id (emphasis in original) (quoting Am. Seamen's Friend Soc'y v. Hopper, 33 N.Y. 619, 625
(1865)).
126 Id. at 680 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
127 See Fogel, supra note 12, at 96 (noting that the standard in Honigman "is a much easier standard
to meet than the standard required by most courts-including other New York courts-that the will be a
product of the delusion"). It is possible that the court in Honigman did not intend to articulate a new
standard.
128 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947).
129 Id. at 205. For analysis of the Strittmater case, including the testator's connection to the National
Woman's Party, see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note I14, at 275-77 (asking whether Strittmater
might "have had another reason for favoring the [National Woman's] Party over cousins with whom she
had little contact"); DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 784
(2013) (questioning the assumptions underlying the court's decision); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and
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Louisa Strittmater, the testator, had very strong opinions about men, whom
"[s]he regarded as a class with an insane hatred .... [and] looked forward
to the day when women would bear children without the aid of men, and all
males would be put to death at birth." 3 o The Prerogative Court set aside the
probate of the will on the ground that her devise to the National Woman's
Party (referred to in the opinion, erroneously, as the "National Women's
Party") was caused by "her insane delusions" regarding men:
Her disease seems to have become well developed by 1936. In
August of that year she wrote, "It remains for feministic
organizations like the National Wom[a]n's Party, to make
exposure of women's 'protectors' and 'lovers' for what their
vicious and contemptible selves are." She had been a member
of the Wom[a]n's Party for eleven years at that time, but the
evidence does not show that she had taken great interest in it.
I think it was her paranoic condition, especially her insane
delusions about the male, that led her to leave her estate to the
National Women's Party. 3 1
The court notes without comment that Louisa's "only relatives were some
cousins of whom she saw very little during the last few years of her life."l32
The court failed to consider the possibility that Louisa might have passed
over those relatives even in the absence of her alleged delusion. 13 3
The Strittmater case illustrates a fundamental problem with the
application of the doctrine of insane delusion for gratuitous transfers. It is
difficult for judges-and especially hard for juries-to set aside their
personal biases and notions of fairness when deciding whether or not to
uphold the testamentary wishes of a person who had delusional beliefs. In
his decision upholding the will in Hargrove, Justice Townley pointed out
that a group of ten "men of importance in New York City" had testified that
Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10 L. & INEQUALITY 137, 143 (1991) (noting that the court did
not consider "whether any level of feminism could avoid the label of extremism and mental instability");
Ronner, supra note 12, at 219-21 ("Under a modem lens, Louisa's chosen beneficiary could be seen as
the 'natural [object] of . . . her bounty."'); Edward S. Halsey, Note, Insane Delusions Affecting
Testamentary Capacity, 2 Wyo. L.J. 84, 84-87 (1947) ("[It does not appear that testatrix was impelled
blindly into execution of her will, nor does it appear that her interest in the Party was great enough to
destroy her free agency in naming the recipient of her property.").
10 Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205.
3' Id at 205-06; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 114, at 277 (discussing the National
Woman's Party and its advocacy for the Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment);
Kristin A. Collins, Representing Injustice: Justice as an Icon of Woman Suffrage, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 191, 196-97 (2012) (noting the Party's strategy in advocating for the Nineteenth Amendment);
Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the Twentieth-Century Questfor Legal and Social Equality, 2 IND. J.L.
& Soc. EQUALITY 80, 82 (2013) (commenting on the Party's advocacy for the Equal Rights
Amendment).
132 Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205.
133 Cf DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 114, at 277 (raising this possibility).
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Ernest Temple Hargrove, a "very successful business man" who spent his
first marriage travelling around Europe, Africa, and Australia, "was at all
times of sound mind and a man of unusual intelligence."l 34 No important
men spoke up for Louisa Strittmater to defend her intelligence or praise her
decision to devise her property to the National Woman's Party. Particularly
in light of the fact that Louisa had no surviving close relatives, it seems cruel
to deny her testamentary wish to benefit an organization devoted to women's
rights."'
In light of the various problems inherent in the application of the
doctrine of insane delusion for gratuitous transfers, Bradley Fogel has
proposed that the doctrine be abolished, leaving the general test of mental
capacity to be the sole test for determining whether the testator was of sound
mind.'36 It is worth noting, however, that the population of elderly
individuals in the United States is increasing as the "baby boom" generation
ages.' 37 There is a higher prevalence of certain mental disorders, such as
dementia, among older individuals."' The current demographic shift may
thus increase the number of cases where wills are challenged on the ground
of lack of mental capacity.' 39 Under these circumstances, any attempt to
remove one of the tools that courts have traditionally had in mental capacity
cases may lead to opposition, and the consequences of such a change require
careful consideration. The next part of this Article considers how recent
scientific studies on delusions and their correlation with other cognitive
impairments might be relevant to efforts to reform the testamentary doctrine
of insane delusion.
4 In re Hargrove's Will, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73.
"' See WRIGHT, supra note 129, at 784 ("Should a person with no spouse or children, whose only
relatives are remote cousins, not be able to leave her property to whatever organization she wants, even
if she has insane delusions about men?").
' Fogel, supra note 12, at 111.
"' See Kevin Kinsella & Wan He, An Aging World: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 12 (2009),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p95-09-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/65Q9-7XNX] ("[A]s the large
birth cohorts ofthe post-World War ll Baby Boom .. .begin to reach age 65 after 2010, the percent older
in the United States will rise markedly").
" See Michele J. Karel et al., Aging and Mental Health in the Decade Ahead: What Psychologists
Need to Know, 67 AM. PSYCHOL. 184, 185 (2012) ("Older adults are more likely to develop dementia,
including Alzheimer's disease.").
"' See Oxford, supra note 12, at 88 ("Although insane delusions are not limited to the elderly, the
rise in the elderly population comes with an increase in the number of persons susceptible to memory-
affecting conditions."); see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 5, at 317 ("The percentage of elderly in
the population has dramatically increased and many challenges to capacity today arise from wills made
by testators of advanced years.").
912 CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:891
PERSONAL REALITY: DELUSION IN LAW AND SCIENCE
II. DELUSIONAL DISORDERS IN MODERN PSYCHIATRY
Before courts and lawmakers set aside a line of cases dating back for
nearly two centuries, it would be wise to consider the scientific
understanding of delusions and how it has evolved over the past two
centuries. Although the discipline of psychiatry has matured considerably
since the concept of "monomania" was first introduced in the scientific
literature, the concept of a delusion remains alive and well and is an
important component of the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. In a
sense, delusions are real, even if their factual basis is imaginary.
A. Delusion as a Clinical Condition
The condition of "monomania" was first diagnosed-and named-
around the year 1810 by the great French psychiatrist Jean-Etienne
Dominique Esquirol.140 The term "denoted an idee fixe, a single pathological
preoccupation in an otherwise sound mind." 41 The term spread quickly to
English-language scientific literature. 142 In the early twentieth century, the
term "monomania" was supplanted by "delusion."' 43 Karl Jaspers defined
delusions as "abnormal beliefs held with extraordinary conviction" that are
"impervious to experiential evidence or counter-arguments" and "often
bizarre."144
DSM-V, the current standard reference guide used by psychiatrists to
diagnose mental disorders, defines "delusions" as "fixed beliefs that are not
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence." 45 Examples include
erotomanic delusions (in which another person is thought to be in love with
the individual); grandiose delusions; jealous delusions; nihilistic delusions;
persecutory delusions; referential delusions (beliefs that "gestures,
comments, environmental cues, and so forth are directed at oneself"); and
somatic delusions (beliefs involving the individual's health and organ
function). 146
The DSM-V standard further distinguishes between "bizarre" delusions,
which are "clearly implausible and not understandable to same-culture peers
and do not derive from ordinary life experiences," and other types of
'4 JAN E. GOLDSTEIN, CONSOLE AND CLASSIFY: THE FRENCH PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 153 (1987).
141 Id. at 155-56.
142 See, e.g., JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS
AFFECTING THE MIND 6 (1835) (listing monomania as one of the principal forms of insanity).
143 See Stein Opjordsmoen, Delusional Disorder as a Partial Psychosis, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
244, 244 (2014) (noting the current definitions of delusions is often dated back to Karl Jasper's 1923
book ALLGEMEINE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE).
'" Id
i4 DSM-V, supra note 4, at 87.
'" Id. at 87, 90.
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delusions.1 47 The barber from Lancaster who believed that he was being
poisoned may have been delusional, but his belief was not so bizarre that
any sane person would reject it without investigating the facts. As the old
saying goes, "just because you're a paranoid doesn't mean they aren't out to
get you." 14 8 By contrast, according to DSM-V, a person who believes that
his or her internal organs have been surreptitiously replaced by an imaginary
surgeon who left no wounds or scars suffers from a bizarre delusion.1 4 9
In DSM-V, "Delusional Disorder" is classified independently from
schizophrenia and other conditions, and it is also given its own numeric code
(297.1).1so In addition to providing a definition and specific examples of
delusions, DSM-V specifies specific criteria that must be met in order to
diagnose a patient with delusional disorder, including the presence of one or
more delusions lasting one month or longer, an absence of schizophrenia or
lengthy manic or major depressive episodes, and a determination that,
"[a]part from the impact of the delusion(s) or its ramifications, functioning
is not markedly impaired, and behavior is not obviously bizarre or odd."'5 1
Delusional disorder generally has a more circumscribed functional
impairment than other psychotic disorders, "although in some cases, the
impairment may be substantial and include poor occupational functioning
and social isolation. . . . A common characteristic of individuals with
delusional disorder is the apparent normality of their behavior and
appearance when their delusional ideas are not being discussed or acted
on."l52
Delusional disorder is not common. According to DSM-V, the lifetime
prevalence of delusional disorder is around 0.2%.1'5 A study in 1998
focusing on a population of individuals aged sixty-five and over found a
prevalence of delusional disorder of 0.04%. 14 Another study found that
persecutory delusions may disproportionately affect older individuals.ss
The theme of persecutory delusions is "the individual's belief of being
conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned, maliciously
maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals." 56
'"Id. at 87.
1 On the origins of this saying, which appears in different forms in a variety of sources, see
CHARLES C. DOYLE ET AL., THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN PROVERBS 189-90 (2012).
14 DSM-V, supra note 4, at 91.
`so Id. at 90.
151 Id.
..Id. at 93.
15 Id. at 92.
154 John R.M. Copeland et al., Schizophrenia and Delusional Disorder in Older Age: Community
Prevalence, Incidence, Comorbidiy, and Outcome, 24 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 153, 158 (1998).
.ss See Naoto Yamada et al., Age at Onset of Delusional Disorder Is Dependent on the Delusional
Theme, 97 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 122, 123 (1998) (finding that the oldest age at onset
was associated with persecutory delusions).
6 DSM-V, supra note 4, at 91-92.
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Jealous delusions, regarding suspected infidelity, are more common in men
than in women.157
The acknowledgement in DSM-V that a person can suffer from a
delusion while otherwise continuing to function normally is consistent with
the traditional definition of monomania. From the perspective of legal
reform, however, the key question is not whether a delusional person can
function in society, but whether they can have the requisite mental capacity
to enter into a valid contract or execute a valid will. In this context, the law
is not interested in behavior, but in cognition. To what extent can a
delusional person make sound decisions notwithstanding the aberrant nature
of their thinking in one particular context? This is the question that must be
answered in order to apply the concept of delusion in the courts. Fortunately,
scientists have begun to focus their attention on this question and are using
controlled experiments and rigorous analysis in their search for an answer.
B. Delusions and Other Cognitive Impairments
Three recent studies may serve to illustrate the techniques currently
being used to assess the likelihood of a correlation between delusions and
other cognitive impairments. The first, by Lars White and Warren Mansell,
focuses on the question of whether delusion-prone individuals are more
likely than others to exhibit the cognitive bias known as "jumping to
conclusions" (JTC)."' Using an opportunity sample composed mainly of
first-year psychology students, White and Mansell divided the participants
into control and delusion-prone categories based on their answers to
questionnaires.' 5 ' The participants were administered a classic experiment
known as the "beads task." 6 0
In the "beads task" experiment, frequently used to determine a
propensity to jump to conclusions,'6 1 the subjects are shown two containers
filled with red and white colored beads.1 62 One container has a ratio of fifteen
white beads to eighty-five red beads, while the other container has the
opposite ratio.' The experimenter then hides the containers and pretends to
draw beads from one of the two containers, asking the participant after each
151 See id at 92.
.. White & Mansell, supra note 20, at 111.
`
9 Id. at 1l 5.
160 Id. at 111, 117.
6' This method was pioneered in the 1960s by Lawrence Phillips and Ward Edwards at the
University of Michigan. See Lawrence D. Phillips & Ward Edwards, Conservatism in a Simple
Probability Inference Task, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 346,347 (1966) (explaining the purpose and
methodology of a "poker chips" experiment aimed at identifying the impact of prior data on subsequent
probability estimates).
162 White & Mansell, supra note 20, at 111.
63 Id.
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"draw" whether he or she is ready to decide which container was selected.1 64
Individuals with a JTC bias are likely to reach a decision after only one or
two "draws," without having sufficient information to make an accurate
guess. 165
White and Mansell found that the control participants in their study
requested a significantly higher number of beads on average than the
experimental group, 16 6 thus demonstrating a tendency of delusion-prone
individuals to jump to conclusions.' 67
The second study, by a team of British researchers led by Richard
Bentall, involved a sample of 173 psychiatric patients being treated in
London and the northwest of England for a variety of disorders, including
both schizophrenia and major depression, 117 of whom were currently
experiencing or had previously experienced paranoid delusions.i6 s This
group was compared to a control group of sixty-four healthy participants to
determine whether any correlation exists between paranoid delusions and
impaired cognitive performance or a pessimistic style of thinking.1 69 The
Bentall study found a correlation between paranoid delusions and a
pessimistic thinking style'70 and also between paranoid delusions and
cognitive impairments;"' however, the former link was the stronger of the
two. 172 On the other hand, the authors found "no specific association
between paranoia and jumping to conclusions bias after controlling for
general cognitive functioning." 7 3 This finding, based on an application of
the beads test, differs with the result of the White and Mansell study.1 74
In the third study, conducted by a different team of British researchers
led by Susannah May Colbert, a group of individuals with current or remitted
delusions were recruited from early-onset psychosis services.'75 The
researchers compared this group with a control group to determine whether
a bias existed toward jumping to conclusions or toward a different
phenomenon known as "jumping to perceptions" (JTP).1 7 6 Individuals who
Id.
6 See id (noting that 40% to 70% of delusional patients decide after just one or two draws).
"Id. at-118-19.
67 Id at 121-22.
6' Bentall et al., supra note 20, at 237-38.
69 Id. at 238.
'
70 Id at 243.
171 Id
172 See id. at 243 ("[E]motion-related processes were more closely linked to paranoia than was
cognitive performance.").
17 3 Id. at 244.
" Compare id. (finding no connection between paranoid delusions and JTC bias), with White &
Mansell, supra note 20, at 119 ("[D]elusion-prone individuals displayed a large JTC effect. . .
s Colbert et al., supra note 21, at 424.
See id. ("[I]t was hypothesised that reduced data-gathering and jumping to perceptions would be
found in individuals with current delusions, and that these biases would be related to each other.").
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show the latter bias tend to identify "an ambiguous perceptual event as
external and real, rather than internal and imaginary." 177 The Colbert study,
like the other two, employed the beads test to determine JTC bias, 178 but the
researchers found no correlation between the current or remitted delusional
groups and JTC.179 However, the Colbert study did find a correlation
between delusions and JTP.s0 Employing an "Auditory Perceptual Bias
Task,"18 1 the study found that individuals who suffered or formerly suffered
from delusions were more likely to report hearing a voice when it was not
there, or vice versa, thus indicating a stronger JTP bias compared to the
control group. 18 2
Because the findings of individual studies may reflect variations in the
subject populations, psychiatrists have also conducted meta-analytic
comparisons to try to make sense of the data.' 83 A meta-analysis conducted
in 2007, before the three studies mentioned above, found "support for the
view that patients with delusions exhibit a genuine difference in the amount
of evidence they require to embrace a hypothesis . .. ."' A more recent
meta-analysis from 2015 found that, although delusional individuals
"required significantly less information than people with psychosis who did
not have delusions" when taking the JTC test, "the difference was small and
the estimate imprecise."'
Although psychiatrists are making progress toward understanding the
possible correlation between JTC bias and delusions in general, few studies
have looked at individual delusional sub-types, such as persecutory
delusions, to determine if there is a correlation with respect to those sub-
177 Id. at 423.
17" See id. at 427 (describing the methodology of its "probabilistic reasoning task," where
participants were told that they had to choose which of two jars a colored bead was drawn from).
179 See id at 435-36 (noting that participants lacked a JTC bias).
' See id at 436 (identifying a JTP bias among study participants suffering from delusions).
.. See id at 426 ("Participants are required to listen to trials of white noise, some of which have a
voice embedded within them. Participants are asked to state how sure they are that they heard a voice
speaking within each trial. The task assesses perceptual biases in either direction; i.e., whether
participants show a bias towards perceiving a voice in the white noise ... or whether participants show
a bias towards perceiving the signal (the voice) as noise.").
182 See id at 433, 436 (finding that delusional participants jumped to perceptions more often than
the control group in the auditory perceptual bias task, and concluding that the results suggest a correlation
between delusions and JTP bias).
.'. See, e.g., Cordelia Fine et al., Hopping, Skipping or Jumping to Conclusions? Clarifying the
Role ofthe J7C Bias in Delusions, 12 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 46, 54 (2007) ("In order to provide
a more objective evaluation of the association of different JTC measures with delusions, we conducted a
meta-analysis.").
184 Id. at 74.
"' Robert Dudley et al., Psychosis, Delusions and the "Jumping to Conclusions" Reasoning Bias:
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. ADVANCE ACCESS, at *5 (2015), doi:
10.1093/schbullsbvl50.
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types.'16 On the other hand, some studies have found that individuals whose
delusions are in remission continue to exhibit JTC bias.' 87 One recent study,
focusing on individuals in early psychosis, found that being prone to
delusions was a stronger predictor of JTC than the current severity of
delusions.'88
At this stage, it would be difficult forjudges and lawmakers to draw any
specific lessons from recent scientific research on the subject of delusions.
It is clear, however, that scientists are interested in delusions and are making
efforts to understand the relationship between those delusions and other
cognitive impairments. The current legal doctrine of insane delusion may
require significant reform, but abolishing that doctrine completely would
only widen the gap between legal and scientific knowledge with respect to
delusional beliefs. The question, then, is what sort of reform might be needed
to make the doctrine of insane delusion useful in the modem law of wills
and other donative transfers. The next Section will address this question.
IlI. REFORMING THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF INSANE DELUSION
As proposed by Fogel, one possible solution to the problems with the
insane-delusion doctrine in the context of gratuitous transfers would be to
abolish it completely, leaving the test of general mental capacity as the
exclusive basis for challenging a will on the ground that the testator was not
of sound mind." Scholars have also proposed less drastic measures that
would retain the doctrine of insane delusion in a modified form. 190 This
Section will discuss the two main proposals that have been made to date and
suggest a new alternative: that courts invert the doctrine so that it may be
used only as a basis for upholding part of the testator's will when the testator
is found to lack general mental capacity.
" See Daniel Freeman, Suspicious Minds: The Psychology ofPersecutory Delusions, 27 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 425, 437 (2007) (noting the scarcity of studies linking persecutory delusions to a JTC
bias).
8' See, e.g., Steffen Moritz & Todd S. Woodward, Jumping to Conclusions in Delusional andNon-
Delusional Schizophrenic Patients, 44 BRITISH J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 193, 195, 203 (2005) (finding a
"hasty response style" in participants with schizophrenia, but exhibiting "no or low current delusional
symptomatology").
" See Robyn Langdon et al., Jumping to Delusions in Early Psychosis, 19 COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 241, 250-51 (2014) (noting that the results of their study showed a significant
correlation between JTC bias and levels of delusion proneness, but not with current delusional
symptoms).
`9 See Fogel, supra note 12, at I10-11 (arguing that the "doctrine of monomania is fatally flawed"
and that courts should instead base all testamentary capacity decisions on the general test for capacity).
" See, e.g., Oxford supra note 12, at 120 (advocating for application of the partial invalidity
doctrine); Ronner supra note 12, at 261 (arguing that courts should apply "sound-mind" and "bizarre
delusions" tests).
918 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:891
PERSONAL REALITY: DELUSION IN LA WAND SCIENCE
A. Proposed Alternatives to Abolition
To date, two main proposals have been made that would retain the legal
concept of an insane delusion while attempting to address some of the
inequities resulting from the current application of that concept. Amy
Ronner agrees with Fogel that the sole test of whether the testator is of sound
mind should be the general test of mental capacity.' 91 As an amendment to
the current general test, however, Ronner would add a requirement that the
decedent suffer from a "bizarre delusion" as defined by the DSM.' 92 Thus,
the concept of a delusion would remain in the law but as a limitation on the
general test of mental capacity. Alan Oxford, focusing on the tendency of
courts applying current doctrine to void the entire will, has proposed a
different solution.' 93 Oxford proposes that, when "a testator otherwise
possesses testamentary capacity and the insane delusion does not affect
every provision in the will," courts should "apply the doctrine of partial
invalidity to preserve any salvageable piece of the testator's legitimate
testamentary intent."' 94
1. Bizarre and Non-Bizarre Delusions
In addition to a classification by theme-erotomanic, grandiose, jealous,
persecutory, and somatic-DSM-V requires that a diagnosis of delusional
disorder specify whether the delusion is "with bizarre content."' 95 A
delusion is "deemed bizarre" if it is "clearly implausible, not understandable,
and not derived from ordinary life experiences,"l9 such as "an individual's
belief that a stranger has removed his or her internal organs and replaced
them with someone else's organs without leaving any wounds or scars."1 97
Noting this psychiatric distinction, Ronner agrees with Fogel that the
traditional independent doctrine of insane delusion should be abolished,'98
but also suggests that a new requirement be added to the general test of
mental capacity: "[T]hat a mentally incompetent testator must also suffer
from what the DSM defines as bizarre delusions."'99
According to Ronner, most of the problems with the traditional insane
delusion doctrine arise in cases where the testator exhibits a non-bizarre
delusion, such as suspicion of marital infidelity.200 Ronner argues that
191 Ronner, supra note 12, at 261.
1 9 2 d
19 Oxford, supra note 12, at 83.
194 Id.
'` DSM-V, supra note 4, at 91-92.
'
9 Id. at 91.
9 Id.
'9' Ronner, supra note 12, at 261.
'
99 Id
20 See id at 214, 222-25 (describing a non-bizarre delusion case in which a husband believed that
his wife was unfaithful).
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adding a bizarre delusion requirement to the general test of mental capacity
would "more effectively help foster the perception of law as legitimate and
essentially rational." 20' This would be a significant change from current law,
which does not require a contestant to allege a delusion in order to challenge
the testator's general mental capacity.202
Although the law has centuries of experience with the concept of a
delusion, 20 3 introducing the psychiatric distinction between bizarre and non-
bizarre distinctions would force judges to make new determinations with
regard to mental capacity. In some cases, judges might have difficulty
deciding whether delusions count as bizarre. This potential problem is
illustrated in the 1932 California case of In re Sandman's Estate.204 Solomon
Sandman, the decedent, was predeceased by his wife in 1917.205 In his will,
executed shortly before his death in 1928, Solomon devised $10 to his
daughter Henrietta Marks, $500 to a woman named Mary Nicholson, and
the residue to his brother Philip Sandman. 20 6 Henrietta contested the will,
arguing that it was the result of Solomon's delusional belief that "he and his
wife were in communication; that she visited and advised him, and that he
could see her moving through the air." 20 7 The court held that the evidence
sufficiently showed that Solomon was suffering from an insane delusion that
caused the disposition in his will and affirmed the lower court's denial of
probate. 208
Applying the DSM-V standard, Solomon could be said to suffer from a
bizarre delusion, insofar as it seems "clearly implausible, not
understandable, and not derived from ordinary life experiences." 209
However, many individuals in the general population believe in ghosts and
other supernatural phenomena. 210 A court forced to decide whether
Solomon's delusion was bizarre would be writing on a clean slate, since that
distinction has not previously mattered in the application of the traditional
doctrine. Under Ronner's formulation, a determination that the belief was
delusional, but not bizarre, would result in the will being upheld in its
entirety, while a finding that the delusion was bizarre would require the court
to analyze the other factors in the general test of mental capacity. This
change would add an additional layer of complexity to the court's decision,
201 Id at 261.
202 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 5, at 317.
203 See Ronner, supra note 12, at 205-06 ("The rule requiring a testator to be of sound mind to make
a will has existed for about five centuries.").
2" 8 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
205 Id. at 500.
20 6 Id. at 499.
207 Id. at 500.
20 8 Id. at 500-01.
209 See DSM-V, supra note 4, at 91 (quoting language from the DSM-V standard).
210 See THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 371 (Robin M. Murray et al. eds, 2003) (citing a
British study in which 25% of the people surveyed expressed a belief in ghosts).
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while leaving open the possibility of bias in favor of the disinherited child.
Another example of a case where the bizarre/non-bizarre distinction
could present difficulties is In re Will of Brush 211 a New York case from
1956. The decedent Ellyn Brush executed a will devising half her estate to
her niece and nephew and the other half to Linda Pringle, a nonrelative who
served as her live-in housekeeper and nurse, among other roles.2 12 The
evidence showed "that the decedent maintained a belief that she had died
during an operation and had been restored to life by the 'right thinking' of
[Pringle] and friends and acquaintances and that on other occasions she had
been helped physically" by Pringle's "right thinking." 213 The trial court
admitted the will to probate,214 but the appellate court ordered a new trial on
the ground that the jury was not properly instructed on the doctrine of insane
delusion.2 15
Ellyn Brush's belief in the restorative effects of "right thinking" might
be called a bizarre delusion. On the other hand, if she had attributed her
recovery to prayer, she would have placed herself firmly in the mainstream
of religious individuals who believe that prayers have healing power.2 16
Religious beliefs have traditionally been held not to be insane delusions, 2 17
although courts have occasionally made exceptions for uncommon
beliefs.2 18 If Ronner's proposal were adopted, courts would be faced with
the novel question of whether a false belief that is similar to-but distinct
from-widely held religious convictions should be classified as not only
delusional but bizarre.
In sum, engrafting a bizarre delusion requirement onto the general test
of mental capacity would create some novel definitional problems for the
courts, which already face a difficult task in trying to assess whether the
211 1 A.D.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
2 12 Id at 625-27.
213 Id. at 627.
214 Id. at 626.
215 Id at 626-28.
216 A vast literature exists on the power of prayer and its connection to healing. See, e.g., HAROLD
E. KOENIG, THE HEALING POWER OF FAITH: How BELIEF AND PRAYER CAN HELP You TRIUMPH OVER
DISEASE 25-26 (1999); PETE KOERNER, THE BELIEF FORMULA: THE SECRET TO UNLOCKING THE POWER
OF PRAYER (2007); SITHEMBILE STEM MAHLATINI, THE POWER OF PRAYER AND BELIEF 39 (2012);
MARK STAVISH, THE INNER WAY - THE POWER OF PRAYER AND BELIEF IN SPIRITUAL PRACTICE 19-24
(2014); CHESTER TOLSON & HAROLD KOENIG, THE HEALING POWER OF PRAYER: THE SURPRISING
CONNECTION BETWEEN PRAYER AND YOUR HEALTH (2003).
2 17 See, e.g., Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1052 (Ill. 1907) ("The fact that an individual holds
any particular belief in regard to a future state of existence cannot of itself be evidence of an insane
delusion or monomania."); Fogel, supra note 12, at 88 n.137 (citing Conner v. Stanley, 14 P. 306, 307
(Cal. 1887)) ("The law pronounces no one insane for mere religious belief, no matter how unreasonable
it may appear to the judge.").
218 See, e.g., Irwin v. Lattin, 135 N.W. 759, 763-64 (S.D. 1912) (holding the "insane delusion" of
"frequent and continual communications with departed spirits" that coerced the testator was not a free
and voluntary act for purposes of executing a valid will).
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other required elements are present.2 19 Adding a poorly defined new factor
to the existing test of mental capacity would also have ethical ramifications
because lawyers have a duty to assess the capacity of a client prior to
executing the will. 220 Although the reform suggested by Ronner could
significantly limit the number of cases in which courts substitute their
personal biases for that of the testator, that problem would remain for cases
of bizarre delusions, and the line between bizarre and non-bizarre delusions
is not clear. It would be preferable to reform the doctrine in a way that would
produce greater accuracy in all cases.
2. Partial Invalidity
Another recent proposal to reform the insane delusion doctrine focuses
on the remedy when a delusion is found to affect part of a will. Despite the
fact that the insane delusion doctrine applies in cases where a testator is at
least partially sane, courts invariably use the doctrine to strike down the
testator's entire will rather than declare it to be partially invalid. 2 21 This is in
sharp contrast to the treatment of wills infected by fraud, undue influence,
or duress, when courts generally strike down only the affected portions of
the will.2 22 Noting this inconsistency, Oxford argues that courts should
"apply the doctrine of partial invalidity to cases involving insane delusion,"
striking only the portion actually influenced by the delusion and preserving
"any salvageable piece of the testator's legitimate testamentary intent." 223
A good example of how the current all-or-nothing approach to insane
delusion cases may frustrate testamentary intent is In re Estate of Killen.224
Dorothy Killen, the decedent, executed a will that left one dollar each to her
niece Carolyn Dixon and two nephews, Russell and R.C. McCannon. 22 5
Another nephew, Marion McCannon, received a significant bequest of
money and other personal property, but Killen also made bequests "to other
family members and friends." 226 Following Killen's death in 1993, Marion
offered the will for probate, but it was contested by the disinherited niece
2' See WRIGHT, supra note 129, at 791 ("[T]here are countless reasons why a person might lack
mental capacity, from the effects of dementia, to drugs, to brain injuries, to age and frailty, to simple
orneriness.").
220 See SUSAN N. GARY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 640-41,
645 (discussing the Model Rules and relevant cases).
221 See Oxford, supra note 12, at 108 n.149 (finding no "reported case where a court actually applied
the doctrine of partial invalidity to [a] will affected by an insane delusion").
222 See id. at 109-10 (citing Arrington v. Working Woman's Home, 368 So. 2d 851, 853 (Ala.
1979); In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P.3d 1088, 1098 (Kan. 2000); In re Koller's Est., 219 N.W. 4, 7-9
(Neb. 1928)).
223 Id. at 83, 120.
224 937 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). Both Fogel and Oxford discuss the Killen case to illustrate
the flaws in the current insane delusion doctrine. Fogel, supra note 12, at 102-03; Oxford, supra note
12, at 105, 111.
225 Killen, 937 P.2d at 1369.
226 Id
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and nephews for want of testamentary capacity. 2 7 The evidence showed that
Killen had a number of false beliefs concerning Carolyn, Russell, and R.C.:
Even though these nephews and niece took care of her when
her husband was ill and after his death and treated her well,
she believed they lived in her attic, or caused others to live in
the attic, and sprinkled chemicals and parasites down on her,
put her to sleep and then pulled a tooth out and cut her arms
and hands with glass, were in the Mafia, and were trying to kill
her so they could take her property. Although other relatives
tried to dissuade Killen from these bizarre beliefs, she would
insist that Russell, R.C., and Carolyn were out to get her.228
The probate court found the will to be invalid, 229 and the Arizona Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that if, at the time of the will's execution, "the
testator knew the natural objects of her bounty but suffered from insane
delusions that affected her perception of those persons and the terms of the
will, the testator did not have the requisite testamentary capacity and the will
is invalid." 23 0
The holding of the Killen court is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, the court conflates the doctrine of insane delusion with the general test
of mental capacity, rather than treating them as separate inquiries. The
general test of mental capacity requires that the testator be capable of
understanding the natural objects of her bounty.231 Killen certainly was
capable of understanding the blood relationship between herself and
Carolyn, Russell, and R.C. The Killen court requires something more: that
her capability be untainted by an insane delusion. 232 The Killen court also
dismisses the usual definition of causation, suggesting that if the delusions
had involved "only staff at the care center," rather than her close relatives,
"the will might have been valid." 233 This comes dangerously close to
formalizing the tendency to discount capacity challenges when the testator's
decision comports with the judge's personal sense of fairness.
In addition to the problems with the Killen court's interpretation of
insane-delusion doctrine, the remedy-setting aside the entire will-seems
overly broad. The opinion states, without further elaboration, that the testator
left property to "other family members and friends" in addition to making
substantial bequests to her nephew Marion.234 As Oxford points out, setting
227 Id. at 1370.22 Id
229 Id. at 1369.
230 Id at 1374.
231 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1(b).
232 Killen, 937 P.2d at 1371-72.
233 Id. at 1374.
234 Id. at 1369.
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aside the entire will in this circumstance violates the fundamental principle
of testamentary freedom.235 The Killen court should have at least considered
the possibility that the testator's bequests to certain friends might have been
made even in the absence of delusion.
Adopting partial invalidity as the default when a will is affected by an
insane delusion would come closer to following the testator's intent. For
example, the court in Sandman might have preserved the $500 devise to
Mary Nicholson, which does not seem to have had any connection to the
testator's alleged delusion regarding the ghostly instructions of his deceased
wife.236 Oxford cites a similar case, In re City National Bank & Trust Co. of
Danbury,2 37 which involved a testator's devise to an imaginary person
named John Gale Forbes whose acquaintance the testator made via Ouija
board. 238 The court declined to invalidate only the disposition made to the
imaginary friend, which had the result of voiding the testator's otherwise
unproblematic devise to two of his servants. 239 As Oxford notes, "by voiding
the entire will, the court destroyed what little unaffected testamentary intent
the testator possessed." 240
The remedy of partial invalidity would help in some cases to limit the
negative consequences of the insane delusion doctrine.24 1 However, it would
not help in cases where the testator's will is, in fact, entirely connected with
the alleged delusion,242 and such cases can be equally problematic. In the
case of In re Estate of Watlack,243 decided in Washington in 1997, a
testator's will was set aside on the ground that it was the product of a
delusional belief that his daughter was stealing from him.244 A provision in
the testator's will stated that he was disinheriting his children "because he
had spent very little time with them" and had previously given his daughter
a 1983 Lincoln.2 45 The court disregarded this explanation without offering
235 Oxford, supra note 12, at 111.
236 See In re Sandman's Estate, 8 P.2d 499, 499-501 (finding sufficient evidence of testator's
"delusion or alienation of reason" based on the testator's daughter's assertion that their relationship had
been "harmonious" without mention to testimony of Mary Nicholson).
237 144 A.2d 338 (Conn. 1958).
238 Id. at 340; Oxford, supra note 12, at 112.
239 In re City Nat'l Bank &Tr. Co. ofDanbury, 144 A.2d at 339-41.
24 Oxford, supra note 12, at I13.
241 See id. at 120-21 (arguing that the doctrine of partial invalidity may appropriately preserve the
testator's intent by voiding the provisions that were the product of insane delusions and preserving the
rest).
242 Id at 108 ("If this insane delusion causes testators to execute a will they would not want but for
the insane delusion, then the court should properly void the will .... ").
243 945 P.2d 1154 (Wash Ct. App. 1997), reh'g denied Nov. 26, 1997.
244 See id at 1156-57, 1159 (explaining the testator's delusional belief and noting that "he still held
the false belief [when signing the will] that Ms. Freeman had stolen money from him and continued to
accuse her of taking the money. From at least March 1988 through the date of his eventual death, Mr.
Watlack suffered from this and other insane delusions.").24 1 Id. at 1156.
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any justification. 246
In his article calling for the abolition of the testamentary doctrine of
insane delusion, Fogel rightly points to Watlack as an illustration of the
doctrine's potential to allow factfinders to substitute their own biases for the
expressed wishes of the testator. 247 Adopting the remedy of partial invalidity
would have been of no help in Watlack, however, because the testator's will
devised all his property to his brother's children.24 8 The will is either entirely
valid, or entirely invalid. The same is true of Honigman, Strittmater, and
many other cases that have been rightly criticized for their infringement of
testamentary freedom.2 49 In order to address the flaws in those cases,
something more than a remedy of partial invalidity is needed.
B. Insane Delusion and Conditional Validity
To date, the various proposals that have been offered to reform the
doctrine of insane delusion all take for granted one longstanding rule:
namely, that the insane-delusion doctrine has no place in cases where the
testator fails the general test of mental capacity.25 0 Fogel states that "if courts
only found individuals who failed the general test for testamentary capacity
to be monomaniacs, then the law of monomania would be superfluous."2 5 1
This conclusion, however, depends on the assumption that a finding of lack
of general mental capacity results in the invalidity of the entire will. If some
part of the will might be held valid even if the testator failed one of the
elements of the general capacity test, then there might be a role for the
doctrine of insane delusion as a test of partial sanity that could result in the
upholding of all or part of the will.
The rule that a lack of general mental capacity invalidates the entire will
is well entrenched.252 If the independent doctrine of insane delusion were
abolished, as proposed by Fogel and Ronner, one would expect to see more
will contests based on an alleged lack of general mental capacity. For
example, there is no evidence in the Strittmater opinion that Louisa lacked
2 See id. at 1158-59 (holding that the facts indicate that the new disposition in the will was mainly
because of his insane delusion, and not because he had not spent much time with his children).
247 Fogel, supra note 12, at 100-01.
248 Watlack, 945 P.2d at 1155.
249 See supra Section L.C.3 (discussing In re Honigman's Will, 168 N.E.2d 676, 676-77 (N.Y.
1960); In re Strittmater's Estate, 53 A.2d 205, 205 (N.J. 1947)); see also Fogel, supra note 12, at 96
("Rejecting a will that is not tainted by the testator's insane delusion impugns the testator's testamentary
freedom. . . .").
250 See Oxford, supra note 12, at 105 ("There is no partial invalidity when a testator lacks
testamentary capacity because the entire will must be void."); Ronner, supra note 12, at 205 ("Although
the same policies minister to both mental capacity and insane delusion theories and contestants frequently
lodge them together, courts treat them as two distinct attacks.").
25 Fogel, supra note 12, at 104.
252 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. c ("A purported
will or revocation of a will by a person who lacks the mental capacity to make a will is void.").
2017] 925
the capability of understanding the factors required for mental capacity.253
In the absence of an insane-delusion claim, however, Strittmater's cousins
would no doubt have framed their will contest in terms of the general-
capacity test and would have pointed to whatever evidence might support a
general-capacity challenge. The same opportunity for bias on the part of the
factfinder would be presented, albeit in a different doctrinal guise.
The result might be quite different if, rather than simply abolishing the
insane-delusion doctrine, the courts repurposed it as a basis for upholding
all or part of a testamentary disposition when the testator failed the general-
mental-capacity test. If the heirs of Strittmater were somehow able to
demonstrate that she lacked general mental capacity, the will proponents
would then have the opportunity to make the argument that Louisa's bequest
to the National Woman's Party was the product of rational thinking, in which
case the bequest would be allowed to stand.
Reformulating the insane-delusion doctrine as a test of partial sanity
would bring the law of mental capacity into harmony with the law of undue
influence, duress, and fraud, all of which are said to invalidate only specific
provisions of the will that are specifically affected.254 Moreover, the court's
holding in the Killen case could be used to justify this shift. The Arizona
Court of Appeals held in Killen that testamentary capacity was lacking when
the testator "knew the natural objects of her bounty but suffered from insane
delusions that affected her perception of those persons and the terms of the
will . ."255 Extending that reasoning, a court might hold that a will is valid
when a testator's lack of capacity stems from an insane delusion that did not
affect the disposition in the will.
To see how a reformulated insane delusion might work in practice,
consider the following hypothetical drawn from a leading casebook on wills,
trusts, and estates.256 Suppose that a testator believed that the trees near his
farm had permanent human occupants. In the testator's will, he devised
$40,000 to provide food for the imaginary tree people and left the remainder
of the estate to his wife.257 Should the devise of $40,000 be upheld as valid?
The first step would be to determine whether the testator lacked general
mental capacity, which, under current law, would invalidate the entire
253 See Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205 ("Miss Strittmater, in her dealings with her lawyer ... and with
her bank, to cite only two examples, was entirely reasonable and normal."). Strittmater's physician did
offer the opinion that Louisa "suffered from paranoia of the Bleuler type of split personality." Id
254 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.3 cmt. d (explaining
that if a donative transfer in a will is obtained through "undue influence, duress, or fraud," only that
transfer is invalid, not the entire will). There is an exception where "[t]he court may ... hold the entire
will invalid if it determines that complete invalidity would better carry out the testator's intent." Id
255 In re Estate of Killen, 937 P. 2d 1368, 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), reh'g denied Oct. 21, 1996.256 LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 231 (3d ed. 2002).
25 7 Id at 231.
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will.25 8 Under current law, if the testator did have general mental capacity,
the next step would be to determine whether the testator suffered from a
delusion. Under the Restatement (Third) of Donative Transfers, the devise
to the tree people would likely be invalid as having been caused by a "belief
that is so against the evidence and reason that it must be the product of
derangement."259 People do not live in trees, and a testator who persists in
believing that they do, contrary to all evidence, would likely be held to suffer
from an insane delusion.260
If the devise to the tree people is stricken as invalid, what happens to the
residuary devise? On the one hand, the Restatement (Third) of Donative
Transfers says that "[a] particular donative transfer is invalid ... to the extent
that it was the product of an insane delusion." 26 1 This would seem tojustify
upholding the residuary devise to the wife against any challenge (e.g., by the
testator's children, if any) because it was not the product of the delusion. On
the other hand, in practice, courts invariably have stricken the entire will
when it is found to be affected by an insane delusion.2 62 Thus, although there
is a strong policy argument for upholding the residuary devise to the wife,
this would not be the likely result as the doctrine is currently applied.
Under the proposed new approach, the court would, as under current
law, begin by applying the test of general mental capacity. If the testator
passed that test, however, the analysis would end, and the entire will would
be valid. If the devise for the benefit of the imaginary tree people was made
to a third party, such as an anti-hunger organization, that organization would
receive the $40,000 and could put it to some other use. On the other hand, if
the devise were made directly to the nonexistent tree people, it would be a
void devise, which is treated the same as a lapsed devise. 263 Since no
antilapse statute could apply to nonexistent persons, the entire estate would
pass to the wife. 2 64 Thus, if the testator had general mental capacity, the
result would be the same as if there were no doctrine of insane delusion.
The biggest departure from existing law under the new approach would
258 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. c ("A purported
will ... by a person who lacks the mental capacity to make a will is void.").
211 Id. § 8.1 cmt. s.
26 Admittedly, trees may be occupied on a temporary basis, generally by children; however, the
desirability of such an accommodation has been questioned. See, e.g., BILL WATTERSON, THE ESSENTIAL
CALVIN AND HOBBES: A CALVIN AND HOBBES TREASURY 26 (1988) ("What on earth makes you think
I'd want to sit in a stupid tree in the first place?").
261 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. s.
262 See Oxford, supra note 12, at 108 n.149 ("There does not appear to be a reported case where a
court actually applied the doctrine of partial invalidity to a will affected by insane delusion.").
263 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 5.5 cmt. a ("A distinction
is sometimes drawn between lapsed devises and void devises . . . . The distinction is of no consequence
in modem law, and is not perpetuated in this Restatement.").
264 See id § 5.5 cmt. n (explaining that when assets are bestowed on nonexistent persons, such as
when the testator devised the estate to deceased persons, the assets are considered "residue" of the estate
and are passed on to the alternative devisee(s)).
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occur if the testator were, in fact, found to lack general mental capacity. For
example, suppose that the factfinder reached the conclusion that the testator
was incapable of understanding the natural objects of his bounty.265 Under
current law, the analysis would end there, and the entire will would be held
invalid.266 By contrast, the proposed new approach would require the
factfinder to answer a second question: was the testator capable of making
some rational decisions? If so, the will would be invalid only to the extent it
was a product of irrational thinking. The $40,000 gift would be stricken, but
the residuary devise to the wife would stand. Because the $40,000 would
pass into the residuary, the wife would receive the entire estate.
An example of a real case that might have come out differently under
the proposed new approach is English v. Shivers,2 67 decided in Georgia in
1963. The testator, LeVert Shivers, left her property to a close male friend,
Emmet Johnson English, because she believed that her children "had
mistreated her by not turning all of their father's estate over to her . . . ."268
The testator's relatives challenged the will on the basis of lack of general
mental capacity, monomania, and undue influence, claiming that English
"would make love to the said Mrs. Shivers and made her believe that he was
in love with her and that her children had treated her wrongfully . . . ."269
The jury ruled in favor of the contestants. 270 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Georgia held that the allegations failed to support a finding of monomania
because the testator's beliefs were based in fact.2 7 ' Nevertheless, because the
testator had been found to lack general mental capacity, and because the
contestants had alleged facts that might constitute undue influence, the
judgment denying probate was upheld.272
If the Georgia Supreme Court had applied the proposed new test, the
determination that Shivers lacked general mental capacity would not end the
case. The jury would then need to consider whether the testator was capable
of making some rational decisions and, if so, whether the decision to
disinherit the children and leave the property to English was rational. The
Georgia Supreme Court's skepticism regarding the claim of monomania
suggests that the bequest to English might be found to be the product of
rational thinking.273 The devise might nonetheless have failed on the ground
265 This is one of four requirements for a finding of general mental capacity. Id. § 8.1(b).
266 See id § 8.1 cmt. c (noting that current law requires a testator to be "of sound mind.").
267 133 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1963).
26 8 Id at 868, 870.
269 Id. at 868-69, 871-72.
270 Id. at 869.
271 Id at 871.
272 Id. at 872-73.
273 See id at 871 ("[WIe observe that there is no statement that Mrs. Shivers' alleged beliefs were
without any foundation in fact. On the contrary, from what is alleged, they were based on fact.")
(emphasis in original).
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of undue influence, but a modem court might take a less skeptical view of
the relationship between English and Shivers.2 74
Although the proposed new approach is a departure from existing law
regarding insane delusions, it might be justified as an extension of the
ancient concept of a lucid interval. As stated in the Restatement (Third) of
Donative Transfers, an individual who is "mentally incapacitated part of the
time," but has "lucid intervals during which he or she meets the standard for
mental capacity" has the power to execute a valid will during such a lucid
interval.275  The lucid-interval doctrine emerged centuries before
psychiatrists first began to understand that a person's mental capacity might
be limited not only at certain times, but with respect to certain subjects. 276
However, the basic notion that insanity should not be an automatic bar to
testamentary capacity could apply equally well in the context of delusions.
Such an approach would also be consistent with the ancient principle that
individuals are presumed to have mental capacity in the absence of contrary
evidence.277
One possible objection to the approach proposed here is that it lacks
precision in cases of partial validity. Suppose again that the testator in the
tree-people hypothetical devised $40,000 not to the tree people, but to an
organization devoted to combating hunger. If the testator were found to have
general mental capacity, the approach advocated here would result in the
entire will being valid, including the $40,000 devise caused by the delusion.
In theory, the current doctrine of insane delusion would be more precise, as
it would permit a court to strike the $40,000 bequest while preserving the
residuary devise. The response to this possible objection is that, in over two
centuries of applying the doctrine of insane delusion, courts have never once
used it in a reported case to strike a portion of a will while upholding the
274 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.3 cmt. f (noting that a
"domestic partner ... is as much a natural object of the testator's bounty as a donor's spouse"); Spivack,
supra note 13, at 281-83 (criticizing judicial assumptions about undue influence in relationships between
older women and younger men).
275 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 5, § 8.1 cmt. m; see MCGOVERN
ET AL., supra note 5, at 317 ("[I]f [the] testator lacked capacity at different periods of her life but when
the will was actually signed had capacity, the will is valid. Conversely, if the testator who was ordinarily
of sound mind executes his will during a brief period when he is not, the will is invalid."). The principle
is an ancient one, tracing back to Roman law and discussed in Henry Swinbume's sixteenth-century
English treatise on the law of wills. See, e.g., JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 71, § 2.12 (Peter Birks & Grant
McLeod trans., 1987) ("An insane person's will is considered valid if it is made in a lucid interval.");
HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 36-37, § 2.3 (London, John
Windet 1590) ("Madfolkes and Lunaticke persons, during the time of their furor or insanitie of mind,
cannot make a Testament. . . . How be it if these madde or lunatike persons have cleer or calme
intermissions, then during the time of such their quietnesse and freedome of minde, they may make their
testamentes, appointing executors, and disposing of their goodes at their pleasures.").
...The lucid interval doctrine is described in a sixth-century introductory textbook of Roman law.
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 275, at 8, 71.
277 See SWINBURNE, supra note 275, at 37, § 2.3 ("[Elvery person is presumed to be of [perfect]
minde and memorie .... ).
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rest.2 78 On the other hand, the concept of partial validity would be no help in
cases like Strittmater when the entire will is related to the alleged
delusion. 27 9
Evidence shows that contested wills are more likely to be set aside when
a testator devises property to nonrelatives and friends, and less likely to be
set aside when property is devised to a close relative. 2 80 In many states,
parties in will contests have a right to demand trial by jury, which puts the
decision in the hands of ordinary individuals with no expertise in probate
matters.281 Studies show that juries are more likely than judges to be
sympathetic to the arguments of will contestants.282 Under the proposed new
approach, the doctrine of insane delusion could no longer be a tool for
mischief in the hands of judges and juries who wish to substitute their own
preferences for that of the testator. Instead, it would be given a new, useful
role: determining whether a mentally incapacitated decedent was
sufficiently lucid to exercise valid testamentary judgment with respect to
certain persons or property unconnected with his or her delusions.
CONCLUSION
The flaws with the traditional doctrine of insane delusion have been
apparent since at least the 1940s. In the field of contract law, the doctrine
has largely been supplanted with a modem test that explicitly focuses on
concerns of fairness. Such an approach cannot easily be translated to the law
of donative transfers, where the fundamental principle is freedom of
disposition. Any reform effort must also take into account the unfortunate
278 See Oxford, supra note 12, at 108 n.149 ("There does not appear to be a reported case where a
court actually applied the doctrine of partial invalidity to [a] will affected by an insane delusion."). My
own research supports the conclusion of Professor Oxford that no reported case exists.
279 See In re Strittmater's Estate, 53 A.2d 205, 205 (N.J. App. Div. 1947), which is discussed in
Section I.C.3 above.
2" See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
607, 607, 659-60 (1987) (examining will contests in Nashville, Tennessee, between 1976 and 1984 and
finding that will contests involving devises to close relatives generally failed, while contests involving
devises to non-relatives were generally successful).
281 See Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons ofJury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 529, 536-40 (examining the right to trial by jury in will contests).
282 See Schoenblum, supra note 280, at 652 ("[W]hile juries split fairly evenly, judges held
decidedly in favor of proponents"); see also Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury Trials
and Mediation as Means ofResolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 180 (1999) (finding that, of
a sample of twenty two judge-tried cases, "only five were originally decided for the contestant[,]" of
which two were reversed, and "seven cases originally decided by ajudge in favor of the proponent were
reversed by the appellate court"). Most wills are not contested, and the percentage of wills that are varies
significantly by jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., The Inheritance Process in San
Bernardino County, Cahfornia, 1964: A Research Note, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1445, 1453, 1467 (2007)
(finding only seven contested wills in sample of 342 testate probate files from San Bernardino County in
1964); Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 3, 30-31 (2008) (finding that eleven of 108 wills probated in Los Angeles County in 1893 were
formally contested and another seven cases resulted in distributions different from those in will).
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biases that factfinders sometimes bring to determinations of mental capacity
in will contests. An approach that seems rational and precise in theory may
be of little use in practice, and perhaps make things worse.
Despite the obstacles, it is imperative that the insane-delusion doctrine
in the law of gratuitous transfers be reformed. Abolishing the doctrine
completely seems unwise, however, particularly in light of the interesting
research currently being conducted by scientists to assess the likelihood of
connections between delusions and other cognitive impairments.
Psychiatrists continue to take the concept of delusion seriously and lawyers
should as well, at least until a better alternative is found. If the doctrine of
insane delusion is prematurely abolished, the courts will have lost a
potentially useful tool in sorting through the testamentary wishes of
individuals with mental illness. It would be difficult to revive the doctrine in
the future if courts come to forget how to apply it.
This Article has suggested that, rather than abandon centuries of
precedent regarding the legal doctrine of insane delusion, courts and
lawmakers should consider repurposing the doctrine in a manner that
promotes rather than frustrates testamentary intent. Reformulating the
doctrine as one of partial sanity, and using it only to validate all or part of a
will when the testator is found to fail the general test of capacity, might
accomplish this goal. When a deluded individual's personal reality differs
from the world the rest of us experience, we should acknowledge the
difference but not give it any more significance than it deserves.
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